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Abstract
In this paper, we ﬁrst provide a simple framework for cooperation in product development
between competitors. We put forward the tradeoﬀ between the beneﬁts obtained through de-
velopment cost sharing and the cost of intensiﬁed competition due to reduced product diﬀeren-
tiation, which implies that no cooperation can be an equilibrium outcome. We allow for ﬁrms
to cooperate partially, i.e., to develop some product components jointly, but not necessarily all
components. This enables us to study the factors that may have an eﬀect on the degree of co-
operation in product development, both in the presence and in the absence of process R&D. We
also analyze the interaction between cooperation decisions on product development and process
R&D. By considering a direct link between the two, we show that the degree of cooperation in
product development may adversely aﬀect the intensity of cooperation in process R&D.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many products are made of distinct product components that, on their own, have no value to
end consumers. In the automotive industry, for instance, a number of product components (e.g.,
engine, break system, suspension system, etc.) are used to produce a single vehicle. Usually, one
distinct product component can be used to produce a variety of products, provided that the relevant
interfaces in diﬀerent varieties are fairly standardized. This is why diﬀerent ﬁrms (that may or may
not be competitors) often agree to develop some product components through cooperative R&D.
For example, in September 2005, the BMW Group, DaimlerChrysler AG, and General Motors
Corporation signed an agreement to form an alliance for the joint development of a two-mode
hybrid drive system for engines that would allow the vehicles to switch to a diﬀerent driving mode
depending on the driving conditions (i.e., in city driving or highway driving). The two-mode hybrid
s y s t e mi sn o wu s e di nd i ﬀerent vehicles of all three participants.1 While ﬁrms cooperate on the
development of a particular product component, each one of them pursues its independent R&D
for other product components that are necessary for the creation of a functional end-product.
This real-world example illustrates the ﬁrst important point we would like to emphasize in this
paper; ﬁrms often cooperate only partially -if at all, and besides the well acknowledged reasons
like high transaction costs, this can also be due to the impact of cooperation on product com-
petition. The co-opetitors’ (the ﬁrms that cooperate in R&D but compete in product markets)
explicit decision on how much to cooperate may also involve an implicit decision on how much to
compete. This is because even if ﬁrms may prefer a higher degree of diﬀerentiation (softer product
competition) at the outset, they may have limited ability to diﬀerentiate their products when they
engage in joint product development for too many product components.2 This, in turn, may imply
that joint product development, along with its beneﬁts, may involve a cost in terms of intensiﬁed
product competition, which may be signiﬁcant in markets where product diﬀerentiation matters
to consumers. With very few exceptions, notably Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000), Lambertini et
al (2002, 2003), and Ghosh and Morita (2006, 2008), the existing literature does not consider any
1For example, in the 2008 model year GM introduced the Chevrolet Tahoe, the GMC Yukon, and the Cadillac
Escalade SUVs, while DaimlerChrysler launched a Dodge Durango SUV with the two-mode hybrid system.
2F i r m ss e e mt obea w a r eo ft h i st r a d e - o ﬀ, and often make public statements to underline how their end-products will
be "diﬀerent" despite the cooperative agreement. For example, after mentioning the beneﬁt so ft h ea l l i a n c eb e t w e e n
BMW Group, DaimlerChrysler AG, and General Motors Corporation, a member of the Board of Management for
Development and Procurement at BMW AG, Prof. Burkhard Göschel, added that "Because the technologies will be
adapted to the individual vehicle models, the participating brands will retain their distinctive characters" (News and
Issues, Sept. 9, 2005, available at http://www.gm.com).
2economic cost of cooperation;3 it concludes that cooperation is, at least in a weak sense, desirable
for ﬁrms since they can always replicate the non-cooperative equilibrium. Furthermore, product
innovations, by and large, are treated as horizontal improvements in products,4 i.e., investments
in product diﬀerentiation. In accord with this view, cooperation in product innovations is usually
modeled as ﬁrms jointly setting the degree of substitution between the products so as to maximize
their joint proﬁts.5 We ﬁnd modeling of product development cooperation as ﬁrms jointly setting
the degree of substitutability between their products or sharing the cost of product diﬀerentiation
not satisfactory.
We also account for the fact that in a variety of industries, potential competitors cooperate both
in product and process innovations. In the majority of the R&D joint ventures that are formed in
the automotive industry, for instance, partners cooperate not only on the development of certain
product components but also on research to discover more cost-eﬃcient ways to produce those
components. For example, BMW, DaimlerChrysler, and General Motors Co. can also cooperate to
attain vertical -either cost or quality- improvements on their hybrid system.6 However, it is very
unlikely that they would jointly carry such process R&D on distinct product components they have
developed independently (such as the break systems). Instead, each ﬁrm conducts in-house process
R&D on these product components, thus suggesting a direct link between product and process R&D
decisions —a link that has been overlooked in the literature and on which this paper aims its focus.
With very few exceptions, the literature on R&D cooperation accounts for a single type of R&D
activity—product or process.7 The papers that consider both types of R&D activities, notably Lin
3Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000) consider an exogenous ﬁxed cost of forming a Research Joint Venture, which can
be attributed to its management or auditing. In Lambertini et al. (2002, 2003) when ﬁrms cooperate in product
innovation they develop a single product, whereas they produce diﬀerentiated products when they do not cooperate.
Therefore, cooperative R&D comes with a cost; it leads to ﬁerce competition post-innovation unless ﬁrms collude at
the competition stage. Ghosh and Morita (2006, 2008) also consider a similar cost, but when cooperation takes the
form of platform sharing.
4See Eswaran and Gallini (1996) for a brief discussion on horizontal versus vertical innovations.
5See, for example, Lin and Saggi (2002). The authors assume an "initial" level of product substitutability between
the products, and product innovation involves investment in diﬀerentiation. In such a setting, cooperation in product
R&D leads to a higher degree of diﬀe r e n t i a t i o nt h a nw i t hn oc o o p e r a t i o n .
6A recent example of joint process R&D as such is the cooperation between BMW Group and PSA Peugeot
Citroën, which resulted in the development of a 1.4 liter petrol engine, which is an improved version of the existing
1.6 liter petrol engine the companies had developed jointly. The latter engine has already been launched within the
car ranges of both partners. (Source: http://www.psa-peugeot-citroen.com)
7Most of the literature, including the seminal papers by Katz (1986) and D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988),
consider cooperation in process R&D. However, the issue has received some attention in the non-cooperative R&D
literature. See, for example, Athey and Schmutzler (1995) and Eswaran and Gallini (1996). There is a large set of other
interesting questions that have been addressed so far, ranging from how private and social incentives for cooperation
compare in diﬀerent settings, e.g., in the presence of uncertainty, synergies, endogenous as well as exogenous spillovers,
with and without an innovation race (see, among others, see Suzumura (1992), Choi (1993), Kamien et al (1992),
and Kamien and Zang (2000)) to how cooperation may aﬀect incentives to maintain post-innovation collusion (see
3and Saggi (2002) and Rosenkranz (2003), consider only the indirect link between the two decisions,
which is their interaction through the competition stage. Considering the aforementioned direct
link that is established by the ﬁrms’ ability to engage in joint process R&D only on the jointly
developed product components also enables us to formally distinguish between joint and in-house
investments in process R&D.8
We ﬁrst introduce a simple framework in which ﬁrms engage only in product development. We
construct a duopoly model with an end-product, composed of distinct components, for which ﬁrms
can engage in joint development. The degree of cooperation determines the degree of commonality
(and hence, the degree of diﬀerentiation) in the two end-products. While ﬁrms share the cost of
developing the common product components, they carry out independent research for the develop-
ment of the remaining components. Therefore, a higher degree of cooperation (i.e., a higher degree
of commonality) leads to savings in development costs, but it intensiﬁes post-innovation compe-
tition by reducing the degree of diﬀerentiation between the competing end-products. A direct
consequence is that no cooperation can be an equilibrium.
The main tradeoﬀ we present in this section is also studied by Lambertini et al (2002, 2003)
with a focus on the impact of RJVs on the sustainability of collusive agreements,9 and by Ghosh
and Morita (2006, 2008) in the context of inter-ﬁrm platform sharing. Ghosh and Morita consider
both the cost savings and the reduced degree of diﬀerentiation that result due to the use of the
same platform -of a given size- by two ﬁrms.10 Diﬀerent than Ghosh and Morita, in our model
t h ed e g r e eo fd i ﬀerentiation and the degree of cost savings due to joint product development are
endogenous to ﬁrms’ decisions on how much to cooperate on product development.
Next, we use a speciﬁc demand setting and bring process R&D into the picture to study the
interaction between product development and process R&D. Once ﬁrms complete their product
development, they invest in process R&D, which reduces the cost of producing product components.
We consider three scenarios: i) no-cooperation; ii) full-cooperation; and iii) partial-cooperation. For
all three scenarios, we assume that ﬁrms decide on how much to cooperate in product development.
Scenarios diﬀer with respect to the process R&D stage.
Martin (1996), Cabral (2000), and Lambertini et al (2002).
8To our knowledge there are only two papers that consider such a “hybrid” structure (i.e., joint and in-house
investments) in process R&D: Goyal et al. (2008) and Atallah (2004).
9Diﬀerently, they assume that formation of a RJV in product development produces completely identical products
for two ﬁrms which would otherwise compete with diﬀerentiated products.
10Besides the cost savings in the development stage, the authors consider another advantage of platform sharing in
their earlier paper: lower expected prices of procurement due to a larger number of potential suppliers for the shared
components.
4Under the no-cooperation scenario, we assume that ﬁrms decide on their process R&D invest-
ments non-cooperatively. Under the full-cooperation scenario, we assume that ﬁrms cooperate in
process R&D on all product components, and share the process R&D costs. These two scenar-
ios are similar to the two scenarios considered by Lin and Saggi (2002); semi-cooperation and
full-cooperation, respectively.11 Similar to Lin and Saggi (2002), we show that under both the
no-cooperation and full-cooperation scenarios, the equilibrium process R&D investments decrease
with the degree of joint product development. Furthermore, the equilibrium degree of coopera-
tion in product development is higher when the marginal cost of component development and the
marginal cost of process R&D are higher.
Under the partial-cooperation scenario, which is the novelty of this paper, ﬁrms cooperate in
process R&D only partially. In particular, we assume that ﬁrms can engage in joint process R&D
only on the product components that they have developed jointly.12 This assumption introduces a
direct link between the degree of cooperation in product development and process R&D decisions,
in addition to their interaction through the competition stage. In contrast with the no-cooperation
and full-cooperation scenarios, we ﬁnd that with partial-cooperation the degree of cooperation in
product development can be lower when the process R&D cost is higher. Our major ﬁnding is that
with partial cooperation the intensity of cooperation in process R&D (deﬁned as relative process
R&D investments in the common and non-common product components) decreases with the degree
of cooperation in product development.
We also show that, for a given degree of cooperation in product development, the ordering
of the equilibrium process R&D investments under diﬀerent scenarios depend on the degree of
product diﬀerentiation. For high degrees of product diﬀerentiation (soft competition in the product
market), the process R&D investments are the highest under full-cooperation, and lowest under
no-cooperation. The investments under the partial-cooperation scenario lie in between the two,
and process R&D investments in the common components are higher than the investments in the
non-common components. The reason is as follows; when competition is soft, the marginal return to
process R&D investments is high, and cost-sharing with cooperation leads to higher investments in
the product components for which ﬁrms cooperate. For low degrees of diﬀerentiation, the ordering
11Except that ﬁrms do not share process R&D costs in Lin and Saggi (2002).
12Cooperation in process R&D is implicit when ﬁrms engage in joint production of the jointly developed product
components, in particular when production is realized in one of the partners’ facilities (for example, the 1.4 liter
petrol engine is produced for both BMW and PSA Peugeot Citroën Groups at the PSA’s plant in Douvrin). Since
joint manufacturing of product components is also likely to involve economies of scale, which is not the focus of our
paper, we assume that each ﬁrm produces product components separately.
5is reversed. This is because when competition in the product market is intense, ﬁrms tend to invest
aggressively in process R&D for the product components that are not subject to cooperation, and
they internalize this competition eﬀect with the product components on which they cooperate.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline our basic model of cooperative
product development and we highlight the factors that aﬀect the degree of cooperation in product
development in the absence of a process R&D stage. In Section 3, we specify a demand setting, in-
troduce process R&D, and study the equilibrium degree of cooperation under the diﬀerent scenarios.
In Section 4 we simulate our model, and provide some welfare analysis. Finally, we conclude.
2 A Model of Cooperative Product Development
We consider an end-product that is composed of distinct product components, for which ﬁrms
can engage in joint development. The degree of cooperation determines the degree of commonality
in the competing end-products. While ﬁrms share the cost of developing the common product
components, they develop the remaining product components independently.
The model we introduce here departs from the standard treatment of product development in
two ways. First, cooperation in product development is not a zero-one decision; instead ﬁrms decide
on the degree of cooperation, which also means that the economies obtained through joint product
development vary with the degree of cooperation. Second, a higher degree of cooperation in product
development implies a lower degree of diﬀerentiation and not the reverse.13 The adverse eﬀect of
cooperation on product diﬀerentiation leads to more intense competition, and hence constitutes a
cost to cooperative product development.
The setting
There are two identical ﬁrms that are engaged in product development, which eventually compete
i nt h ep r o d u c tm a r k e tw i t hd i ﬀerentiated products. Once the products are developed, ﬁrms can
produce at a constant marginal cost of .P r o ﬁto fﬁrm , gross of development cost, is denoted by
 (),w h e r e stands for the degree of product diﬀerentiation, with  ≥ 0 and  =1 2.
Product development The product is composed of a continuum of components, which is nor-
malized to 1. The marginal development cost of the  component is denoted by (). Letting
13See, for example, Lin and Saggi (2002), who ﬁnd that the equilibrium level of product diﬀerentiation is higher
under cooperation than with no cooperation.
6() denote the total cost of developing  product components, we have
()=
Z 
0
().
Cooperation in product development The ﬁrms jointly decide on the product components
that they will jointly develop, that is, on the degree of commonality in their products, ,w i t h
 ∈ [01].
The degree of commonality, , represents the degree of cooperation in product development;14
 =0corresponds to the case in which there is no cooperation, whereas  =1corresponds to
t h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h eﬁrms develop the entire product together. The degree of cooperation in
product development determines both the product development costs and the degree of product
diﬀerentiation.
i. Product development costs The ﬁrms share the development cost of common compo-
nents, (), equally. Each ﬁrm also conducts in-house R&D to develop the remaining product
components, for which each ﬁrm bears the full development cost. Therefore, for a given degree of
cooperation ,e a c hﬁrm has a product development cost of
()=(1) −
()
2
.( 1 )
The ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of equation (1) represents the total cost of product devel-
opment, and the second term represents the savings obtained through joint development of prod-
uct components. In our setting, the sole beneﬁt of cooperation in product development is cost
sharing, and there are no synergies from joint component development.15 Furthermore, we have
((1) − ()) + ()=(1), and hence, there are no economies (or diseconomies) of scope in
developing the components.
ii. Degree of product diﬀerentiation The degree of diﬀerentiation between the ﬁrms’
products, , is determined by the degree of commonality, . We assume that ()  0,t h a t
is, the degree of diﬀerentiation decreases with the degree of commonality.
14We use the degree of cooperation in product development and the degree of commonality interchangeably through-
out this paper.
15If one considers synergies in joint product development that are non-decreasing with the degree of cooperation,
, one could also read ()2 as the beneﬁts obtained through the synergies.
7The timing
The ﬁrms ﬁrst decide cooperatively on ,a n d() and () are realized. Then, ﬁrms compete
with prices and obtain a gross proﬁto f (()).
The equilibrium
We now characterize the equilibrium and highlight the main trade-oﬀ that is involved in ﬁrms’
decisions on how much to cooperate in product development.
Given the symmetry of the ﬁrms, at the second stage, for a given degree of cooperation, ,
each ﬁrm obtains a gross proﬁto f(()).A tt h eﬁrst stage, ﬁrms cooperatively set the degree of
cooperation in product development so as to maximize their joint proﬁts, which is tantamount to
maximizing their individual proﬁts:
max
∈[01]
 (()) − ().( 2 )
The solution to this problem characterizes the equilibrium degree of cooperation, ∗,w h i c hc a n
be either a corner solution, i.e., no cooperation or full cooperation, or an interior solution, i.e.,
∗ ∈ (01). Since our focus is on the forces that aﬀect the degree of cooperation, we restrict our
analysis to an interior solution, and hence, begin by studying its existence.
The second order condition to the problem deﬁn e di n( 2 )i s
2 ()
2
µ


¶2
| {z }
I
+
()

2
2
| {z }
II
+
1
2
2
2
| {z }
III
 0.( 3 )
Since ()
2  0 and () ≥ 0, the signs of terms I and II are determined by the signs
of 2 ()2 and 22, respectively. Notice that, with linear development and diﬀerentiation
technologies, terms II and III vanish, and inequality (3) holds if and only if 2()2  0;w e
have an interior solution only if () is concave for some values of . More generally, an interior
solution exists if (), and/or () and/or () is suﬃciently concave. In the rest of the paper we
assume that this is the case.
Given that there is an interior solution, the equilibrium degree of cooperation in product devel-
8opment is characterized by the ﬁrst order condition,
()



+
1
2


=0 .( 4 )
The ﬁrst term in (4) is negative, whereas the second term is positive, which puts forth the following
trade-oﬀ: a higher degree of cooperation implies greater savings in development costs (develop-
ment cost eﬀect), but at the same time a higher degree of commonality implies a lower degree of
diﬀerentiation, which harms ﬁrms in the competition stage (competition eﬀect).
Firms will choose to cooperate more in product development if the competition eﬀect is mild
relative to the development cost eﬀect. The competition eﬀect is mild if either the marginal eﬀect
of diﬀerentiation on proﬁts is small, and/or the degree of commonality has a small marginal eﬀect
o nt h ed e g r e eo fd i ﬀerentiation. Therefore, we might expect to observe a high degree of cooperation
in markets where product diﬀerentiation is not an important determinant of competition and/or
in markets where product development costs are relatively large.
This simple trade-oﬀ is one potential explanation as to why ﬁrms do not cooperate on all
product components in some product markets (if they cooperate at all). This trade-oﬀ has not
been accounted for in the standard cooperation literature, in which ﬁrms are, at least weakly,
better-oﬀ with (full) cooperation. As an exception, Ghosh and Morita (2006, 2008) consider similar
costs (reduced diﬀerentiation) and beneﬁts (cost sharing) of cooperation in the context of platform
sharing. Diﬀerent from our setting, they consider ﬁrms that make binary choices —whether to share
a platform or not. Allowing for continuous choices enables us to study the factors that might have
an impact on the varying degree of cooperation between competing ﬁrms.
3 Interaction between Product Development and Process R&D
In this section, we add a process R&D stage to our basic setting and study the interaction between
product development and process R&D by specifying the demand and cost functions. We consider
three cooperation scenarios: no-cooperation (NC); full-cooperation (FC); and partial-cooperation
(PC).
For all three scenarios, we assume that ﬁrms cooperate in product development and decide on
the product components to be jointly developed. Scenarios diﬀer with respect to cooperation in
process R&D.
Under the no-cooperation scenario, we assume that ﬁrms decide on their process R&D invest-
9ments non-cooperatively. Under the full-cooperation scenario, we assume that ﬁrms cooperate in
process R&D on all product components, and share the process R&D costs. In both scenarios, there
is no direct link between the product development and process R&D decisions and they interact
only through the competition stage. Our no-cooperation and full-cooperation scenarios are similar
to the semi-cooperation and full-cooperation scenarios of Lin and Saggi (2002), except that Lin
and Saggi do not consider cost-sharing in joint process R&D investments.16 We also use the same
demand speciﬁcation as Lin and Saggi. Note, however, that our modeling of product development
is diﬀerent from theirs.
Finally, under the partial-cooperation scenario, which is not considered by Lin and Saggi (2002),
ﬁrms cooperate in process R&D only partially. We assume that the ﬁrms can engage in joint process
R&D only on the product components that they have developed jointly. This assumption introduces
a direct link between the degree of cooperation in product development and process R&D decisions,
which is the main novelty of our framework. We also assume that the ﬁrms share the cost of the
joint process R&D investments.
Demand Let the inverse demand for ﬁrm  be deﬁned by
 =  −  − (1 − ) (5)
where  and  denote the quantity and price of ﬁrm  with  =1 2 and  6=  and  ∈ [],
with  ∈ (0) and  ≤ 1.
Process R&D Process R&D reduces the constant marginal cost of production. Firms decide
how much to invest in process R&D for each product component. We assume that ﬁrm  sets the
same level of process R&D investment, , for all product components that are jointly developed
with ﬁrm  (i.e., for  components), and sets the same level of process R&D investment, −,f o r
all components that it develops with in-house R&D (i.e., for (1 − ) components).17 The constant
marginal cost of production of ﬁrm  after process R&D is
16We adopt the same modeling approach as in the joint venture cartelization case in Kamien et al. (1992) and
Rosenkranz (2003). Diﬀerently, other papers, e.g., d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Lin and Saggi (2002),
assume only coordination of R&D investments, and not cost - s h a r i n g( w h i c hi sr e f e r r e dt oa sR & Dc a r t e l i z a t i o nb y
Kamien et al.).
17We assume symmetric investments across jointly developed components and symmetric investments across non-
common components. One can assume away symmetry and show that the equilibrium indeed involves symmetric
investments when the cost of process R&D (taking into account potential cost-sharing) is the same across components.
See Appendix A0 for the proof.
10 =  −  − (1 − )− (6)
where  denotes the constant marginal cost of production prior to any process R&D investment.18
We assume that  .
The cost of conducting process R&D for ﬁrm  is denoted by  and is composed of two parts;
 () and − (−) represent the costs of process R&D investment for the common and
non-common product components, respectively. We have
 ( −)= ()+− (−)=
2

2
+ −(1 − )
2
−
2
,( 7 )
with  = − =1under the no-cooperation scenario (i.e., each ﬁrm fully bears its cost of process
R&D investments for all components),  = − =1 2 under the full-cooperation scenario (i.e.,
ﬁrms equally share the cost of process R&D investments for all components), and  =1 2 and
− =1under the partial-cooperation scenario (ﬁrms share the cost of process R&D investments
only for the common components). Finally,  reﬂects the cost of process R&D investments, and
we assume that it is suﬃciently high so that all second-order conditions for proﬁt maximization
hold.19
The timing
I. Product R&D. Firms cooperatively decide on , the degree of cooperation in product
development, and () and () are realized.
II. Process R&D.
NC: Firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively set  and −.
FC: Firms simultaneously and cooperatively set  and −.
PC: Firms simultaneously and cooperatively set  and non-cooperatively set −.
18Our focus in this paper is the partial-cooperation scenario. In this scenario, the in-house process R&D eﬀorts are
on the product components that are developed independently and they are less likely to entail spillovers. Therefore,
we assume that one ﬁrm’s independent process R&D eﬀorts − have no impact on the other ﬁrm’s marginal cost
of production, .
19Under no cooperation, the lower bound on  depends on the lower bound of the degree of diﬀerentiation, .
Under full cooperation, the condition is 1. Finally, under partial cooperation, the condition is max{1()}
with () ∈ (0∞).
11Then,  ( −) and  ( −) are realized.
III. Competition. Firms compete with prices and proﬁts are realized.20
In this setting, ﬁrms decide on joint and in-house process R&D investments once all product
components (i.e., the end-products) are developed.21
3.1 No-cooperation (NC) and Full-cooperation (FC)
In this section, we analyze the NC and FC scenarios. In the NC scenario ﬁrms cooperate only at
the product development stage, whereas in the FC scenario ﬁrms cooperate on all (common and
non-common) product components at the process R&D stage. We use superscripts NC and FC to
distinguish between the scenarios.
Stages II and III — Process R&D and Competition The proﬁt functions at Stage III
(competition stage) are identical in both scenarios and can be found in Appendix A1.
At stage II, under the NC scenario, the ﬁrms set process R&D investments non-cooperatively
on the common components, , and the non-common components, −, which corresponds to the
semi-cooperation scenario of Lin and Saggi (2002). Hence, the analysis is similar and can be found
in Appendix A1. The equilibrium process R&D investments for each ﬁrm under the NC scenario
are
NC
 = NC
− = NC =
2( − )
¡
1+2  − 2¢
(1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− )+2 2 − 4 − 2
.( 8 )
Diﬀerently, under the FC scenario, the ﬁrms set the process R&D investments in the common
components, , and the non-common components, −, cooperatively in order to maximize their
joint proﬁts at stage II. The equilibrium process R&D investments for each ﬁrm are22
FC
 = FC
− = FC =
4( − )
(2 − )(1+)
2  − 4
.( 9 )
20See Bourreau and Dogan (2007) for the analysis with Cournot competition.
21One could also consider an alternative timing in which ﬁrms ﬁrst decide how much to cooperate on product and
process R&D, and then set their in-house process R&D investments. With this alternative timing, ﬁrms would be
able to internalize the negative impact of competition in process R&D on the non-common components through their
process R&D investments in the common components. Indeed, our analysis with such an alternative timing show
that, ﬁrms choose lower process R&D investments in the common components compared to the timing we consider
in this paper. However, our simulations show that the diﬀerence in the equilibrium degree of cooperation in product
development with diﬀerent timings is insigniﬁcant. The analysis is available upon request from the authors.
22See Appendix A2.
12The following Proposition provides some comparative statics for both scenarios at Stage II and
is identical to Part (i) of Proposition 2 of Lin and Saggi (2002), i.e., to the result they obtain for
their semi-cooperation (our NC) scenario.23
Proposition 1 Under no-cooperation and full-cooperation scenarios, the equilibrium process R&D
investments are increasing with .
Proof. See Appendix A3.
For a given degree of diﬀerentiation, the process R&D investment has a positive direct eﬀect and
a negative strategic eﬀect on proﬁts. The impact of the degree of diﬀerentiation on the magnitude of
these eﬀects is as follows. A higher degree of diﬀerentiation increases the magnitude of the positive
direct eﬀect as it shifts the demand outwards. At the same time, a higher degree of diﬀerentiation
reduces the magnitude of the strategic eﬀect, since the eﬀect of a cost advantage on the equilibrium
prices is lower with less intense competition. Therefore, a higher degree of diﬀerentiation implies
higher investments in process R&D through a larger positive direct eﬀect and a smaller negative
strategic eﬀect.
A sah i g h e rd e g r e eo fc o o p e r a t i o ni np r o d u c tR & Dl o w e r st h ed e g r e eo fd i ﬀerentiation, it leads
to lower process R&D investments, compared to the case in which ﬁrms do not cooperate in product
development ( =0 ).
Finally, although the same comparative statics apply to both scenarios, we will show later that
for any given level of , each scenario yields diﬀerent equilibrium levels of process R&D investment.
Stage I — Product R&D Firms set  to maximize their joint proﬁts, which we denote by Π
,
with  =NC, FC. Hence, the ﬁrms solve
max
∈[01]
Π
 ()=
2 X
=1

III,
 (()  (())  (())) −  ( (())) − (),( 1 0 )
where 
III,
 (()  (())  (())) is the equilibrium gross proﬁto fﬁrm  in stage II and NC
and FC are deﬁned in equations (8) and (9). As in Section 2, we assume that Π
 () is concave,
a n dw ef o c u so nt h ei n t e r i o rs o l u t i o nd e ﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition.
23Note that  in our setting corresponds to (1 − ) in the setting of Lin and Saggi (2002).
13Let 
 denote the joint proﬁts gross of process R&D costs and development costs. We have

 (1 2)=
III,
1 (1 2)+
III,
2 (1 2)
Under the FC scenario, FC is set optimally to maximize joint proﬁts at stage II. Therefore, by the
envelope theorem, the ﬁrst-order condition writes:
ΠFC


=
FC
 (FC FC)


 | {z }
competition eﬀect
+ ()=0 .( 1 1 )
Under the NC scenario, ﬁrms set FC independently at stage II, therefore, the ﬁrst-order condition
writes:
ΠNC


=
NC
 (NC NC)


 | {z }
competition eﬀect
+

III,NC
1
−2
NC
2 ()



| {z }
indirect strategic eﬀect
+

III,NC
2
−1
NC
1 ()



| {z }
indirect strategic eﬀect
+()=0 .( 1 2 )
Note that under both scenarios, apart from the last term (), which represents the marginal
development cost, a higher degree of cooperation has only indirect eﬀects on the ﬁrms’ proﬁts,
which work through the degree of diﬀerentiation, .
The competition eﬀect, which is represented by the ﬁrst terms of equations (11) and (12),
is negative. A higher degree of cooperation in product development leads to a lower degree of
diﬀerentiation, which in turn intensiﬁes competition. Diﬀerent than the FC scenario, under the
NC scenario, there is an indirect strategic eﬀect which is channeled through the impact of the
degree of diﬀerentiation on the process R&D investments of each ﬁrm. The second and the third
terms in equation (12) represent this indirect strategic eﬀect, which is positive. For any given ﬁrm,
a lower degree of diﬀerentiation decreases the process R&D investments of the rival ﬁrm (from
P r o p o s i t i o n1 ) ,w h i c hi nt u r ni n c r e a s e st h ep r o ﬁts of the ﬁrm in question. Therefore, under the
NC scenario, although the ﬁrms do not cooperate in process R&D, they partially internalize the
negative strategic eﬀect of process R&D investments on proﬁts by setting the degree of cooperation
in product development in stage I. Under the FC scenario, these eﬀects are absent in the ﬁrst-order
condition since ﬁrms fully internalize the negative strategic eﬀect of process R&D investments
by setting the process R&D investments jointly at stage II. Yet, we cannot conclude that ﬁrms
cooperate more in product development under the NC scenario than under the FC scenario, since
14the competition eﬀects under the two scenarios are computed for diﬀerent values of process R&D
investments.
In the following Proposition we characterize the equilibrium degree of cooperation for both
scenarios.
Proposition 2 Under no-cooperation and full-cooperation, the equilibrium degree of cooperation
in product development (i) is higher when the marginal cost of component development, (),i s
higher, and (ii) increases with the cost of process R&D investments, .
Proof. See Appendix A4.
The eﬀect of development costs on the degree of cooperation in product development is straight-
forward; everything else being equal, a higher () implies greater savings from cooperation in prod-
uct development.24 This is true in both scenarios, as the marginal cost of component development
is separable in the optimization problem.
Under both scenarios, the equilibrium degree of cooperation in product development increases
with the cost of process R&D investments, but for diﬀerent reasons. When ﬁrms cooperate in
process R&D, the only impact of  on the equilibrium degree of cooperation in product develop-
ment is through the competition eﬀect (i.e., the direct eﬀect of the degree of diﬀerentiation on joint
proﬁts), that is, through the proﬁt margins. The responsiveness of proﬁts to the degree of diﬀeren-
tiation, and hence the marginal cost of cooperation in product development, varies with .M o r e
precisely, a higher  implies that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are less responsive to the degree of diﬀerentiation,
hence, the magnitude of the direct eﬀect is lower. To understand why, ﬁrst consider the extreme
case in which the degree of diﬀerentiation is zero. In this case, ﬁrms obtain zero proﬁts regardless of
their marginal cost, and hence, regardless of their joint investments in process R&D. Now, consider
the other extreme case in which ﬁrms are local monopolies. Then, proﬁts are decreasing with mar-
ginal cost of production, and hence, with .Ah i g h e r, therefore, implies a smaller proﬁtm a r g i n
for each ﬁrm, which in turn implies a lower marginal cost of cooperation in product development
(i.e., a smaller negative marginal eﬀect of the reduced degree of diﬀerentiation on ﬁrms’ proﬁts).
Under the NC scenario, the magnitude of the negative competition eﬀect also decreases with ,
for the same reasons as above. However, since ﬁrms compete in the process R&D stage under this
scenario, there are also indirect strategic eﬀects. It turns out that the magnitudes of the positive
indirect strategic eﬀects also decrease with .W h e n  is higher, ﬁrms compete less aggressively
24Note that, "a higher  ()"c o r r e s p o n d st oaf u n c t i o n1 (), such that 1 () ≥  () for all  ∈ [01].
15in the process R&D stage, which in turn reduces the indirect eﬀects of the degree of diﬀerentiation
through process R&D investments. Ultimately, the impact of a higher  on the competition eﬀect
dominates its impact on the indirect strategic eﬀects, which is why the degree of cooperation
increases with  under the NC scenario.
Finally, Proposition 2 also implies that the degree of cooperation in product development is more
likely to be high when ﬁrms cannot engage in process R&D, for example, because of a prohibitively
high . In such a case, the analysis would be the same as in Section 2.
3.2 Partial-cooperation (PC)
In this section, we assume that ﬁrms’ ability to cooperate in process R&D depends on the degree
of cooperation they had in product development. More precisely, we assume that ﬁrms can engage
in joint cost reducing activities only on the common product components that they have jointly
developed. For the non-common product components, ﬁrms can conduct in-house process R&D.25
We solve the game backwards, starting from the competition stage. The equilibrium proﬁts of
ﬁrms at the ﬁnal stage are the same as in the other scenarios, and can be found in Appendix A1.
Stage II — Process R&D The ﬁrms set the per-component process R&D investment in the
common product components, PC
 , cooperatively in order to maximize their joint proﬁts, ΠPC
1 +
ΠPC
2 . Simultaneously, each ﬁrm  sets its per-component process R&D investment in the non-
common components, PC
−, so as to maximize its own proﬁt.
We ﬁnd that process R&D investments in common and non-common product components of
each ﬁrm constitute strategic complements; a higher process R&D investment in the common com-
ponents implies a higher process R&D investment in the non-common components. The equilibrium
cooperative and in-house process R&D investments for each ﬁrm are26
PC
 =4 (3 − )b  (13)
and
PC
− =2
¡
1+2  − 2¢
b ,( 1 4 )
25One could also consider the case in which ﬁrms engage in independent process R&D on the jointly developed
components in addition to their joint process R&D. However, due to symmetry of the ﬁrms it would be suboptimal
for ﬁr m st od os o ,a n dh e n c e ,w ee x c l u d et h i sp o s s i b i l i t ya tt h eo u t s e t .
26See Appendix A5.
16with
b  =
( − )
(1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− )+2 2 − 4 − 2+2 (2 − 4 +1 )
.
We now analyze how the degree of cooperation in product development aﬀects the equilibrium
level of process R&D investments. The eﬀect of the degree of cooperation in product development
on the equilibrium process R&D investments can be decomposed in the following way:
PC

=
PC

+
PC



,( 1 5 )
where PC can be read either PC
 or PC
−. There are various eﬀects that interact. The ﬁrst term on
the right hand side of equation (15) represents a direct eﬀect; that is, it describes how the change in
 aﬀects the process R&D investment decisions through cost-sharing and coordination of process
R&D investments for a given . The second term represents the indirect eﬀect of  on process R&D
investments, which works through the degree of diﬀerentiation. A higher  implies a lower degree
of diﬀerentiation, which in turn aﬀects the process R&D decisions. This is because the degree of
diﬀerentiation aﬀects the magnitudes of the direct and strategic eﬀects of process R&D on proﬁts
(which we have discussed under the NC and FC scenarios). With the following table, we summarize
t h es i g no fe a c he ﬀect.27
Table 1 : Marginal eﬀect of  on process R&D investments
Direct eﬀect
PC
Indirect eﬀect
PC × 
(+) if  ≥ e 
(−) if e 
(−)
The sign of the indirect eﬀect is always negative and the intuition follows that of Proposition 1.
The sign of the direct eﬀect is positive only if the degree of diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently large. This
is because the two sources of the direct eﬀect, cost-sharing and coordination of investments, work
in opposite directions. A higher  enables ﬁrms to engage in joint process R&D on more product
components. On one hand, this tends to increase process R&D investments in the common com-
ponents through the positive eﬀect of cost-sharing. On the other hand, it implies that competition
in process R&D investments is softer (as ﬁrms cooperate on more product components), which in
27See Appendix A6 for details.
17turn tends to reduce the level of process R&D investments in the common components. When the
degree of diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently high (i.e., when product competition is soft), the latter eﬀect
is insigniﬁcant, and the former eﬀect determines the sign of the direct eﬀect. Since process R&D
investments in common and non-common components are strategic complements, the sign of the
marginal eﬀect of  on process R&D investments in the non-common components follows that of
the marginal eﬀect of  on process R&D investments in the common components.
The marginal eﬀect of the degree of cooperation on process R&D investments is, therefore,
ambiguous except for suﬃciently low degrees of diﬀerentiation. For suﬃciently low degrees of
diﬀerentiation, both direct and indirect eﬀects are negative, and process R&D investments in both
common and non-common product components decrease with the degree of cooperation in product
development. For higher degrees of diﬀerentiation, however, the sign of the marginal eﬀect depends
on the values of  and , and can be either negative or positive.
Although the impact of  on process R&D investments is ambiguous for higher degrees of
product diﬀerentiation, it has an unambiguous impact on the intensity of cooperation in process
R&D, which we deﬁne as the ratio PC
 PC
− . The intensity of cooperation provides a measure of
how per-component process R&D eﬀorts compare for joint and in-house R&D. The intensity of
cooperation is 1 with full-cooperation, whereas it is zero with NC.
Proposition 3 Under partial-cooperation, the intensity of cooperation in process R&D decreases
with the degree of cooperation in product development.
Proof. See Appendix A7.
A higher degree of cooperation in product development lowers the degree of product diﬀeren-
tiation, which in turn leads to more aggressive process R&D investments. Since the process R&D
investments in the common components internalize this strategic eﬀect and the investments in the
non-common components do not, the ratio of process R&D investments in common components to
process R&D investments in non-common components is lower with a higher degree of cooperation
in product development.
With the following Proposition, for a given degree of cooperation in product development,
we compare the levels of process R&D investments in the common and non-common product
components for all three scenarios.
18Proposition 4 For a given degree of cooperation in product development, , we have
FC ≥ PC
 ≥ PC
− ≥ NC
if e , and the order is reversed if  ≤ e .
Proof. See Appendix A8.
First, note that the ordering of process R&D investments under NC and FC scenarios depends
on the value of .T h i si sb e c a u s ew h e n is low (intense competition in the product market), ﬁrms
tend to compete aggressively in process R&D investments, which leads to a higher investment level
under the NC scenario (i.e., when all process R&D investments are realized in-house). For higher
values of  (soft competition in the product market), process R&D investments yield a higher
marginal return due to a greater price-cost margin. Since ﬁrms share the cost of process R&D
investments under FC, this leads to a higher investment compared to the NC scenario.
The level of process R&D investments under the PC scenario lies between the NC and FC
scenarios. With PC, the ordering of process R&D investments in the common and non-common
components also depends on the degree of diﬀerentiation. The intuition is similar to that provided
above. Under the PC scenario, ﬁrms undertake both joint and independent process R&D invest-
ments. When  is high, marginal returns of process R&D investments are high for both common
and non-common components. Since cost sharing applies only to the investments in the common
components, process R&D investments are higher for those components compared to those in non-
common components.28 When  is low, ﬁrms aggressively invest in process R&D in the components
that they have independently developed, and coordinate on a lower level of process R&D investment
in the common components.
Note that this result does not hold when ﬁrms coordinate, but do not cooperate, in process
R&D. If ﬁrms were to set  cooperatively, without sharing the process R&D investment costs29
the order would be
NC ≥ PC
− ≥ PC
 ≥ FC
for all . This is because in the absence of cost sharing and spillovers, coordination on cost reduction
investments has merely a collusive eﬀect, which yields lower investments compared to the case in
28Note that the cost sharing eﬀect would be even stronger if one accounts for some synergies, which reduce the
marginal cost of joint investments.
29This is called "R&D cartelization" by Kamien et al. (1992).
19which ﬁrms decide non-cooperatively.
Stage I — Product R&D Firms set  to maximize their joint proﬁts,
ΠPC
 ()=
2 X
=1

III,PC
 (() PC
 (()) PC
− (()))−(PC
 (()) PC
− (()))−(),
where 
III,PC
 (() PC
 (()) PC
− (())) is the equilibrium gross proﬁto fﬁrm  in stage
II and PC
 and PC
− are deﬁned in equations (13) and (14).
Let
PC

¡
() PC
  PC
−1 PC
−2
¢
=
2 X
=1

III,PC

¡
() PC
  PC
−1 PC
−2
¢
,
and let  = 1 + 2 denote the total process R&D costs. Since PC
 is set so as to maximize the
ﬁrms’ joint proﬁts, by the envelope theorem, the ﬁrst-order condition is
ΠPC


=
PC




+

III,PC
1
−2
PC
−

+

III,PC
2
−1
PC
−

+
PC


−


+ ()=0 ,
which can be decomposed as
PC



 | {z }
competition eﬀect
+

III,PC
1
−2
PC
−



| {z }
indirect strategic eﬀect
+

III,PC
2
−1
PC
−



| {z }
indirect strategic eﬀect
+ ()
+

III,PC
1
−2
PC
−

| {z }
direct strategic eﬀect
+

III,PC
2
−1
PC
−

| {z }
direct strategic eﬀect
+
PC

 | {z }
direct MC eﬀect
−

 | {z }
direct R&D cost eﬀect
=0 .
(16)
Similar to the FC and NC scenarios, the competition eﬀect is negative. Also, similar to the NC
scenario, the indirect strategic eﬀect30 is positive. This is because, as we know from our analysis
f o rs t a g eI I ,al o w e rd e g r e eo fd i ﬀerentiation (due to a higher degree of cooperation in product
development) leads to a lower level of process R&D investments for the rival ﬁrm, which implies a
higher proﬁtf o rt h eﬁrm in question.
Unlike the other scenarios, there are three direct eﬀects under the PC scenario; a direct strategic
eﬀect, a direct marginal cost (MC) eﬀect, and a direct R&D cost eﬀect.
30Note that the second and the third terms, which represent this eﬀect, are equal since they are computed in the
symmetric equilibrium of the process R&D subgame.
20The presence of the direct strategic eﬀect is due to the direct link we have introduced in the PC
scenario; the degree of cooperation in product development determines the degree of cooperation
in the process R&D stage, since we assume that ﬁrms can carry joint process R&D only on the
product components they have jointly developed. Therefore, diﬀerent from the other scenarios,
the degree of cooperation in product development under this scenario has a direct impact on the
process in-house R&D investments of a given ﬁrm, which then has an impact on the rival ﬁrm’s
proﬁts. The sign of this direct strategic eﬀect can either be negative or positive. As summarized
in Table 1, PC
− is negative when  is suﬃciently small, and is positive otherwise. Therefore,
the direct strategic eﬀect is positive when  is suﬃciently small, and is negative otherwise.
Finally, there are two additional direct eﬀects; a direct eﬀect of  on joint gross proﬁts (through
marginal costs), and a direct eﬀect of  on total process R&D costs, which are also absent in the
NC and FC scenarios. These two eﬀects have the same source. When  increases, the share of
the total cost reduction (resp., total process R&D costs), which is due to the joint process R&D,
increases. If PC
  PC
−, then a higher  will lead to a higher cost reduction (resp., total process
R&D cost), ceteris paribus.
The direct MC eﬀect of  on joint gross proﬁts can be either positive or negative. A higher
degree of cooperation in product development leads to a larger reduction in the marginal cost of
production (due to a higher share of the joint process R&D) if the joint process R&D investments
are higher than the in-house R&D investments. From Proposition 4, we know that this is true for
suﬃciently high values of , and hence, the direct MC eﬀect is positive only if  is suﬃciently high.
The direct R&D cost eﬀect of  on joint gross proﬁts can also be either negative or positive.
This is because a higher  has two opposite eﬀects. First, when the degree of cooperation in product
development is higher, ﬁrms carry more joint process R&D, which tends to decrease their R&D
costs due to cost sharing. However, when ﬁrms switch from in-house process R&D to joint process
R&D on some components (due to a higher ), they also increase the amount of process R&D on
those components if  is high (follows from Proposition 4). This second eﬀect, in turn, tends to
increase the total R&D costs. The ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second, and hence the direct R&D
cost eﬀect is positive, for suﬃciently low values of , whereas the opposite is true for higher values
of .
In the following Proposition we characterize the equilibrium degree of cooperation.
Proposition 5 Under partial-cooperation, the equilibrium degree of cooperation in product devel-
opment (i) is higher when the marginal cost of component development, (), is higher, and (ii)
21can either increase or decrease with the cost of process R&D investments, .
Proof. See Appendix A9.
The process R&D cost, , has a negative marginal impact on the magnitude of all the eﬀects
we have mentioned above.
Since the competition and indirect strategic eﬀects are also present in the NC scenario, the
qualitative nature of the analysis we have provided on the eﬀect of  on the equilibrium degree of
cooperation in product development, ∗, through these eﬀects also holds in the PC scenario. First,
ah i g h e r l e a d st oah i g h e r∗, as it decreases the magnitude of the (negative) competition eﬀect.
This is because a higher  implies lower process R&D investments (immediate from equations (13)
and (14)), which then implies a higher marginal cost of production in equilibrium. This, in turn,
lowers the magnitude of the negative competition eﬀect, which is present in all three scenarios.
Second, similar to the reasons we have discussed under the NC scenario, the magnitude of the
indirect strategic eﬀects decreases with .
Under the PC scenario,  has an additional impact on ∗, through its impact on the magnitudes
of the direct (strategic, R&D cost, and MC) eﬀects that are absent in other scenarios.
The magnitude of the direct strategic eﬀects can either increase or decrease with ,a st h e r ea r e
two opposing underlying eﬀects, cost-sharing and coordination of investment, that are discussed
under the second stage analysis of the game.
The direct MC eﬀect, when isolated from other eﬀects, implies that a higher , which reduces
the magnitude of this eﬀect, may lead to either a higher or a lower ∗ depending on the degree of
diﬀerentiation. If the degree of diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low, then the direct MC eﬀect, which
is negative (as the process R&D investments are higher in the non-common components than in
the common components) is smaller in magnitude with a higher , which leads to a higher ∗.I f
the degree of diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently large, than the direct MC eﬀect is positive, and hence, a
higher  implies a lower ∗.
Finally, a higher  also reduces the magnitude of the direct R&D cost eﬀect, and may lead to
either a lower or a higher ∗ depending on the degree of diﬀerentiation. When  is suﬃcienly low,
ah i g h e r tends to decrease ∗, and the reverse is true when the degree of diﬀerentiation is high.
As this analysis shows, accounting for a direct link between the cooperation decisions on product
development and process R&D stages (our PC scenario) alters the ﬁndings of a setting in which
such a link is absent (our NC and FC scenarios). First, we have process R&D eﬀorts decreasing with
the degree of cooperation in product development under the FC and NC scenarios, whereas, the
22direction of this eﬀect is ambiguous under the PC scenario. Second, although the equilibrium degree
of cooperation in product development increases with the cost of process R&D eﬀorts under the
FC and NC scenarios, it can either increase or decrease under the PC scenario. This is because the
direct link we have introduced in this scenario creates direct eﬀects (strategic, MC, and R&D cost)
that are absent otherwise. These direct eﬀects can work in the reverse direction of the competition
eﬀect (which dominates the indirect strategic eﬀect in the absence of the direct eﬀects). Finally,
the direct link we consider in this scenario enables us to analyze cooperative process R&D eﬀorts
relative to independent process R&D eﬀorts. Our analysis suggests a substitutability between the
degree of cooperation in product development and the intensity of cooperation in process R&D.
Remark 1 The intensity of cooperation in process R&D is lower for a higher (), whereas it can
either increase or decrease with .
This remark follows directly from Propositions 3 and 5. We know that the intensity of coopera-
tion in process R&D decreases with the degree of cooperation in product development (Proposition
3). We also know that the degree of cooperation in product development is higher when () is
higher, and that it can either increase or decrease with . Therefore, a higher () implies a higher
degree of cooperation in product development, which in turn implies a lower intensity of cooperation
in process R&D. However, the impact of  on the intensity of cooperation is ambiguous.
4 Equilibrium degree of cooperation in product development and
public policy
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss the economic forces that determine the equilibrium degree of co-
operation and compare the equilibrium degree of cooperation under the three scenarios. We also
provide a comparison of the equilibrium social welfare. We then provide a benchmark case in which
cooperation in product development is banned ( =0 ), and compare the equilibrium process R&D
investments, consumer welfare, and social welfare in the NC and PC scenarios to those in the
benchmark case. We provide analytical results when possible, and revert to numerical simulations
otherwise.
4.1 Equilibrium degree of cooperation in product development
We begin with a pair-wise comparison of the three scenarios.
23The equilibrium degree of cooperation in product development is higher under NC than under
FC, that is,   , unless the degree of diﬀerentiation is very low.31 Under both the NC and
FC scenarios, there is no direct link between the two cooperation stages, and from Proposition 1,
we know that the degree of product diﬀerentiation and process R&D investments are complements.
From Proposition 4, we also know that the process R&D investments under FC are higher than
those under NC, unless the degree of diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low. Therefore, we might indeed
expect the equilibrium degree of cooperation to be higher under NC than under FC, except for low
degrees of diﬀerentiation.
The equilibrium degree of cooperation in product development can be either higher or lower
under PC than under NC. This is because, on the one hand, the degree of cooperation has direct
eﬀects on proﬁts under PC that are nonexistent under NC, and that are positive overall, which
tends to lead to a higher degree of cooperation under PC. However, the sum of the competition
eﬀect and of the indirect strategic eﬀects, which is negative, can be either higher or lower under
PC than under NC, and hence the total eﬀect is ambiguous. Depending on whether the former or
the latter eﬀects dominate, cooperation can be either lower or higher under PC compared to NC.
A similar argument applies for the comparison of the equilibrium degree of cooperation under
the PC and FC scenarios, and hence, we can have either   , or the reverse.
Since it is not possible to provide a complete comparison analytically, we now revert to nu-
merical simulations. We adopt the following functional form for the diﬀerentiation function,
()= +(  − )(1− ),w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes our assumption, ()  0. We assume that
()= (1 − )2, which implies that the marginal development cost decreases with  (lower
layers are more costly to develop than higher layers), and that ()=
¡
 − 22
¢
2. Without
any loss of generality, we set  =7and  =2 .32
We run our simulations for {} ∈ {010205}×{ +0 1+0 2+0 4}×{551150}.33
Our simulations show that when ﬁrms cooperate in product development in all three scenarios,
we have34
PC  NC  FC.( 1 7 )
31The necessary condition for this is 0208. The proof is available upon request from the authors.
32This is because the parameter of interest in the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal  is ( − )
2.
33We also ran our simulations for two alternative speciﬁcations: (i) ()= +(  − )(1− )
12,a n d()=;
(ii) ()=+( − )(1− )
12 and ()=

 − 
22

2.W i t hs p e c i ﬁcation (i), the adverse eﬀect of component-
sharing on diﬀerentiation is more important for high layers (high ) than for low layers (low ), whereas the marginal
development cost is constant. Speciﬁcation (ii) is a mix of our main speciﬁcation and speciﬁcation (i). Our results
presented in this section are robust to these two alternative speciﬁcations.
34With our speciﬁcation, and for all parameter values, the proﬁt function is concave in .
24Note that this ordering may be violated when one considers a very low degree of diﬀerentiation,
i nw h i c hc a s ew ek n o wt h a tFC  NC,a n dt h a tPC can be either lower or higher than the
equilibrium degree of cooperation in the two other scenarios.
Thresholds of  for a positive degree of cooperation and for no product development
When studying the equilibrium degree of cooperation in product development, we have ruled out
t h ec a s ew h e r eﬁrms do not cooperate at all in this stage. However, given that ﬁrms jointly
set the optimal degree of cooperation, they will choose to cooperate only if cooperation brings a
higher proﬁt than when they develop their products independently. A major determinant of this
decision is the cost of product development, . In our setting, a higher  increases the likelihood
of cooperation, as it increases the marginal beneﬁt of cooperation through cost sharing. Let  ()
denote the minimum value of , such that there is a strictly positive degree of cooperation in product
development in the equilibrium of scenario , that is, we have  ()  0,w i t h =NC, FC, PC.
An interesting question is then, how the threshold of  compares under the three scenarios. In other
words, under which scenario should we expect to observe cooperation in product development more
often?
From Propositions 2 and 5, we know that the equilibrium degree of cooperation in product
development increases with  under all scenarios. Therefore, the ordering of the equilibrium degree
of cooperation in product development that we obtain with our simulations (inequality 17) also
implies that
()  ()  (),
which is conﬁrmed by our simulations. The ﬁgure below illustrates our simulation results for the
equilibrium degree of cooperation in the NC, FC, and PC scenarios.
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Cooperation in product development in the NC, PC, and FC scenarios, for  ∈ [0407].
F i n a l l y ,w h e nt h ec o s to fp r o d u c td e v e l o p m e n ti ss u ﬃciently high, ﬁrms may obtain negative
proﬁts even if they do cooperate in product development and share the costs associated with it.
Therefore, there exists a threshold , above which the optimal degree of cooperation in product
development yields negative proﬁts to ﬁrms. Let 

() denote this upper bound for  in each
scenario , above which the equilibrium proﬁt (for the equilibrium ) is negative. By comparing
 () under diﬀerent scenarios, we can also determine how viable the product market is under the
diﬀerent scenarios.
Firms have the greatest ﬂexibility under the FC scenario, in that they can replicate both the NC
and PC process R&D investments. Under the FC scenario, ﬁrms also share the costs associated with
the process R&D investments, and hence, in equilibrium they make necessarily a higher proﬁtt h a n
under the other scenarios. Similarly, ﬁrms make higher proﬁts under the PC scenario than under
the NC scenario (where there is neither cost-sharing nor coordination on process R&D investments).
Therefore, we have


()  

()  

(),
which is also conﬁrmed by our simulations.
Social Welfare under three scenarios
The social welfare is given by  = +Π1 +Π2,w h e r e denotes the consumer surplus, which
is given by  =( ( 1)
2 +( 2)
2 +2( 1− )12)2,w h e r e denotes the quantity of ﬁrm ,a n dΠ1
and Π2 are the ﬁrms’ proﬁts net of process R&D and product development costs.
The equilibrium of stage II is always symmetric, and hence we have 1 = 2 =  at this stage.
26We ﬁnd that
 =
 − e 
(1 + )(2− )
,
where e  denotes the marginal cost post-process R&D. Therefore, we have
 =( 2− )2 =
( − e )
2
(1 + )
2 (2 − )
,( 1 8 )
which implies that for a given  (hence, ), consumer surplus is higher when the cost-reduction is
higher (e  is lower).
Under the NC and the FC scenarios we have e  =  − ,w i t h =NC,FC, whereas, under the
PC scenario we have e  = −PC
 −(1 − )PC
−. The expressions for consumer welfare and social
welfare can be found in Appendix B1.
As consumer surplus (for a given ) is higher when e  is lower, it follows from Proposition 4 that
FC () ≥ PC () ≥ NC () (19)
for e , and the order is reversed if  ≤ e . The intuition is the same as the one provided after
Proposition 4. Since the equilibrium degree of cooperation in product development is diﬀerent
under diﬀerent scenarios, we cannot expect inequality (19) to hold in the equilibrium.
Our simulations show that for  ∈ {0405}, inequality (19) also holds with the equilibrium
degrees of cooperation in product development. This is also true for  ∈ {010203} in more than
50 per cent of the cases.
Finally, when the market is viable under the three cooperation scenarios,35 our simulations show
that the same ordering holds for the social welfare, i.e.,
FC ≥ PC ≥ NC,
unless  is very low.36
35When the market is viable only under FC, then the social welfare is clearly higher under FC than in the two
other scenarios.
36In our simulations, this is true whenever  ≥ 02.W h e n =0 1,w eﬁnd that the social welfare can be highest
in any of the three scenarios.
274.2 Cooperation in Product Development and Public Policy
In this section we ask whether policy makers should be concerned with the negative consequences
of cooperation in product development between competing ﬁrms.37 To that end, we introduce a
benchmark case in which ﬁrms are banned from cooperating in product development ( =0 ).
We compare the process R&D investments, the consumer welfare, and the social welfare in this
benchmark with the equilibrium process R&D investments, the consumer welfare and the social
welfare in the NC and PC scenarios.38
Since we are interested in the eﬀect of allowing cooperation in product development, we assume
(as in our model analysis) that there is indeed a strictly positive degree of cooperation in product
development in the equilibrium when ﬁrms are free to set . Given this assumption, allowing
cooperation in product development improves the industry proﬁts in both scenarios. This is simply
because when ﬁrms jointly set the degree of cooperation, they maximize the industry proﬁts. The
question is then, how does allowing cooperation in product development aﬀect consumer welfare?
Recall that under our speciﬁcation, the consumer surplus is given by equation (18), and that it
depends both on post-process R&D production costs and on the degree of diﬀerentiation.
Allowing cooperation in product development has two eﬀects on the consumer surplus: a market
competition eﬀect, which is channeled through the degree of diﬀerentiation; and a production cost
eﬀect, which is channeled through the process R&D investment decisions. In what follows, we study
each eﬀect individually.
Market competition eﬀect Under both scenarios, allowing cooperation in product development
reduces product diﬀerentiation, and hence, aﬀects the consumer surplus in two opposite ways. A
lower degree of diﬀerentiation hurts consumers as consumers value a greater variety, but at the
same time it beneﬁts consumers due to more intense competition in the product market. With
our demand speciﬁcation, the latter eﬀect dominates the former, which means that, everything else
equal, a higher degree of cooperation in product development increases consumer surplus.
Cost of production eﬀect Consumer surplus increases with a lower cost of production post-
process R&D investments. From Proposition 1, we know that in the NC scenario the process R&D
37We thank one of the anonymous referees, who brought up this relevant question.
38When  =0 , the NC and PC scenarios lead to the same outcome, in which ﬁrms cooperate neither in product
development nor in process R&D. Hence, a comparison of the NC and PC scenarios when cooperation in product
development is allowed proves to be meaningful, which is not true for the FC scenario.
28investments are decreasing with the degree of cooperation in product development. Hence, allowing
cooperation in product development leads to a higher cost of production, which hurts consumer
welfare.
From our analysis in Section 3.2, we know that in the PC scenario the process R&D investments
can either increase or decrease when we allow for cooperation in product development, except in
cases with suﬃciently low degrees of diﬀerentiation. When the degree of diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently
low, the eﬀect of a higher  on process R&D investments is negative, and the direction of this eﬀect
is ambiguous otherwise.
The overall eﬀect on consumer surplus Ap r i o r i ,t h eo v e r a l le ﬀect of allowing cooperation in
product development on consumer surplus is ambiguous in both scenarios, except for some special
cases under the PC scenario. Under the PC scenario, a higher degree of cooperation in product
development may lead to higher process R&D investments when the degree of diﬀerentiation is
suﬃciently high, and hence, to a higher consumer surplus.
Our computations for the NC scenario show that the consumer surplus increases with the degree
of cooperation in product development if the degree of diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low.39 For the
PC scenario, we ﬁnd that the consumer surplus is higher when cooperation in product development
is allowed versus when it is not, if the cost of process R&D investments is suﬃciently high and/or
the degree of diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low. When the cost of process R&D investments is high,
and when ﬁrms can cooperate in product development (which enables them to cooperate in process
R&D as well), cost-sharing gives ﬁrms an additional incentive to invest in process R&D, which in
turn increases consumer welfare.
Simulations of the variations in process R&D investments, consumer welfare and social
welfare Since our general analysis does not exclude the possibility that the consumer surplus may
decrease upon allowing cooperation at the product development stage, the eﬀect of such a policy
on social welfare is ambiguous. We, therefore, revert to numerical simulations to determine the
variation of consumer and social welfare when one allows for cooperation in product development.
Let 
 denote the relative variation in social welfare when moving from the benchmark (no
39Indeed, the consumer surplus is decreasing with  at  =0 .
29cooperation at all) to the equilibrium in scenario ,w i t h =NC, PC. That is, 
 is deﬁned as

 =
 () −  ( =0 )
 ( =0 )
.
We deﬁne similar ratios for the consumer surplus, and process R&D investments, denoted by

 and 
, respectively.40 We run our simulations and compute the minimum, maximum and
mean value41 of these ratios for {} ∈ {010205}×{  +0 1+0 2+0 4},  ∈
{551150},a n d ∈
n
 () ()+0 1

()
o
. The simulation results are summarized
in the table below:
Table 3: Relative variations in process R&D,
consumer surplus, and social welfare
No-cooperation Partial-cooperation
NC
 NC
 NC
 PC
 PC
 PC

min 000 000 −009 000 000 −026
max 050 015 000 061 017 042
mean 013 006 −004 016 009 014
Given the speciﬁcations of our model, allowing cooperation in product development increases
the consumer welfare, and hence, the social welfare, under both scenarios for the entire range of
parameters we have considered.
Under the NC scenario, although cooperation in product development lowers the process R&D
investments, it increases the consumer surplus, and hence, the social welfare, due to the intensiﬁed
competition in the product market. Under the PC scenario, there are two additional eﬀects due to
the direct link between cooperation decisions at the product development and process R&D stages.
First, allowing cooperation in product development in this scenario can increase the process R&D
investments due to cost-sharing. Second, since the equilibrium degree of cooperation is higher under
the PC scenario, a lower equilibrium degree of diﬀerentiation reinforces the market competition
eﬀect, which in turn beneﬁts consumers.
Note that our results hinge on the demand speciﬁcation we have adopted, with which consumers
value price competition more than variety. In markets where consumers have a relatively higher
40In the partial cooperation scenario, we use the total cost reduction, which is deﬁned as 
PC
 +( 1− )
PC
−.
41The mean value is deﬁned by the sum of all computed ratios divided by the number of computed ratios.
30valuation for variety, allowing cooperation in product development would decrease consumer surplus
in the NC scenario. Diﬀerently, under the PC scenario, the eﬀect on consumer surplus may remain
positive, as an increase in the process R&D investments may oﬀset the negative eﬀect of reduced
variety.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have provided a simple framework for cooperation in product development between
competitors that puts forward the tradeoﬀ between the beneﬁts obtained through development cost
sharing and the cost of intensiﬁed competition due to reduced product diﬀerentiation. A direct
consequence is that no cooperation can be an equilibrium outcome. Our framework also diﬀers
from the standard treatment of R&D cooperation in that it allows for ﬁrms to jointly develop some
product components, and not necessarily all. This enables us to study the factors that may have
an impact on the degree of cooperation in product development both in the presence and in the
absence of process R&D.
We have also analyzed the interaction between cooperation decisions on product development
and process R&D. While doing so, we have considered a direct link between cooperation decisions
in product development and process R&D, and showed that the degree of cooperation in product
development may adversely aﬀect the intensity of cooperation in process R&D.
All results, except for those stated in Propositions 1 and 4 hold under Cournot competition.
Diﬀerent from Bertrand competition, where the strategic eﬀect of process R&D investments on
proﬁts is negative, both direct and indirect (strategic) eﬀects are positive with Cournot competi-
tion. For a given degree of diﬀerentiation, both no-cooperation and full-cooperation scenarios yield
a higher equilibrium process R&D investment under Cournot competition than under Bertrand
competition. Furthermore, the equilibrium degree of cooperation in product development under
Cournot competition is also higher than under Bertrand competition. For a given level of coopera-
tion in product development, the partial-cooperation scenario with Cournot competition yields the
following ordering for process R&D investments FC ≥ PC
 ≥ PC
− ≥ NC, which is also true with
Bertrand competition, but only for high degrees of diﬀerentiation.
Finally, we ran numerical simulations to illustrate how introducing a direct link between two
cooperation stages aﬀects the likelihood of cooperation in product development, and the degree of
cooperation, as well as the social welfare for speciﬁed diﬀerentiation and product development cost
31functions. Given our speciﬁcations, partial-cooperation yields the highest equilibrium degree of
cooperation in product development. However, the social welfare under partial-cooperation lies in
between the social welfare under full and no-cooperation. Society beneﬁts most when ﬁrms jointly
invest in process R&D on all product components (i.e., with full-cooperation).
We have adopted a duopoly setting in which the degree of cooperation in product development
refers to the number of product components that are jointly developed. However, in an oligopolistic
setting, the degree of cooperation may also involve another dimension, that is, the number of ﬁrms
involved in joint development. One question is then, how the number of participants of an R&D
alliance relates to the number of product components that are developed within that alliance, which
is left for future research.
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346A p p e n d i x
A0 Symmetric process R&D investments
Lemma 6 Consider a set  =[ ] ⊂ [01] of components of the product of a given ﬁrm, with
 ,a n dl e t() denote the process R&D investment for common component ,f o r ∈ .
Assume that the process R&D cost parameters are the same for all  ∈ , that is,  =  and
 = . Then, equilibrium process R&D investments satisfy ()= for all  ∈ .
Proof. The total cost reduction and process R&D cost are
 =
Z

(),a n d  =
Z


()
2
2
,
respectively. Let
 =
1
 − 
Z

()
be the average per-component investment. Setting  for each component  ∈  would yield the
same total cost reduction,  (and hence would not aﬀect gross proﬁts at the competition stage),
and a total cost of process R&D of
0 =
Z


2
2
 =

2
( − )2.
The variance of () is
2 ≡
1
 − 
Z

(() − )
2  ≥ 0,
w h i c hc a nc a na l s ob ee x p r e s s e da s
2 =
1
 − 
Z

³
()
2 − 2()+2
´

=
1
 − 
Z

³
()
2
´
 − 2 ×
1
 − 
Z

() + 2
=
1
 − 
Z

³
()
2
´
 − 2.
35Since 2 ≥ 0, this proves that
1
 − 
Z

³
()
2
´
 ≥ 2,
hence that
0 =

2
( − )2 ≤

2
Z

³
()
2
´
 = .
It is clear that this inequality is strict if 2  0,t h a ti s ,i f() is "dispersed". Therefore, starting
from an asymmetric allocation of process R&D investment levels, the ﬁrm could maintain the same
total cost reduction and decrease its total process R&D cost by averaging its investments across
the set of components , which would increase its proﬁt. This proves that the equilibrium levels
of investment are necessarily symmetric.
A1 No-cooperation. Let 
NC
 denote the equilibrium gross proﬁto fﬁrm  in stage ,w i t h
 =II, III.
Stage III — III
 and III
 . At Stage 3, ﬁrm  maximizes NC
 =(  − ) with respect to ,
where  is given by
 =
 −  +( 1− )
(2 − )

Replacing for  in NC
 , and computing ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) and solving for the system
yields Bertrand equilibrium prices,
III
 =
( + )(3− ) − (1 − )( − )
( +1 )( 3− )

and proﬁts,

III,NC
 =
((3 − )( − )+( 1− )( − ))
2
(1 + )
2 (3 − )
2 (2 − )
.( 2 0 )
The same analysis applies for the FC and PC scenarios, and hence we have 
III,NC
 = 
III,FC
 =

III,PC
 .
Stage II — NC
 and NC
− For a given , ﬁrms simultaneously and non-cooperatively set NC

and NC
− to maximize
ΠNC
 = 
III,NC

¡
NC
  NC
− NC
  NC
−
¢
− () − 
¡
NC
  NC
−
¢

36where () and 
¡
NC
  NC
−
¢
are determined in equations (1) and (7). We replace (6) for 
and ,a n d( 2 0 )f o r
III,NC
 in ΠNC
 , and compute the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to NC

and NC
− for  =1 2. Solving for the four FOCs with four unknowns yields
NC
 = NC
− = NC =
2( − )
¡
1+2  − 2¢
(1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− )+2 2 − 4 − 2
.
These values maximize the proﬁtf u n c t i o ni ft h eH e s s i a nm a t r i xi ss y m m e t r i cn e g a t i v ed e ﬁnite,
which is the case if
2
¡
2 − 2 − 1
¢2 2
(1 + )
2 (3 − )
2 (2 − )
−   0,
and

2
¡
2 − 2 − 1
¢2
(1 + )
2 (3 − )
2 (2 − )
,
which is true for all  if

2
¡
2 − 2 − 1
¢2
(1 + )
2 (3 − )
2 (2 − )
.( 2 1 )
Notice that the right-hand side of (21) belongs to (12∞). Finally, replacing for NC
 and NC
− in
, and then replacing for  in 
III,NC
 yields

II,NC
 = 
II,NC
 = II,NC =
( − )
2 ( +1 )
2 (3 − )
2 (2 − )2
³
 (2 − )(3− )( +1 )
2 +2 2 − 4 − 2
´2.
A2 Full-cooperation The gross proﬁto fﬁrm  can be written as

III,FC
 =

¡
 −
¡
 − FC
 − (1 − ) e −
¢¢2
(1 + )
2 (2 − )

Computing the FOCs for FC
 and FC
−, and solving the system of equations, we ﬁnd
FC
 = FC
− = FC =
4( − )
(2 − )(1+)
2  − 4

This is a maximum if the Hessian matrix is symmetric deﬁnite negative, which is the case if
max
½
4
(2 − )(1+)
2
4
(2 − )(1+)
2
¾

37which is true for all  and  if 1.R e p l a c i n g for 
III,FC
 yields
II,FC =
2 ( − )
2 (1 + )
2 (2 − )
³
(2 − )(1+)
2 − 4
´2 
A 3 P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Under NC, we have
NC

=
2( − )( +1 ) ()
³
(2 − )(3− )(1+)
2  +2 2 − 4 − 2
´2,
with  ()=2 4 −113 +192 −11+5.W eh a v es i g nNC =sign  () and we have  ()  0
for all  ∈ [01]. Under FC, we have
FC

=
8( − )(1+)
¡
2 −  +1
¢
h
(2 − )(1+)
2  − 4
i2 
Since 2 −  +1 0 for all ,t h e nFC  0 for all .
A4 Proof of Proposition 2. Let NC (()) = II,NC (()) − (NC (())).W e s t a r t b y
proving that NC increases with .S i n c et h eﬁrms make the same proﬁt in the equilibrium of stage
II, the degree of cooperation which maximizes the ﬁrms’ joint proﬁt also maximizes NC (()).
Therefore, the FOC can be written as
ΠNC


=
NC

()


−


=0 ,
which can be rewritten as

¡
NC
¢
=
NC

()


+
1
2


=0  (22)
As


¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=NC
 0
due to the second-order condition (SOC), equation (22) implicitly deﬁnes a function NC (),a n d
we have
NC ()

= −


¯
¯ ¯
=NC


¯ ¯
=NC

38Since


¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=NC
 0 we have sign
NC ()

= sign


¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=NC
We have


=




µ
NC

()
¶
,
and we have


µ
NC

()
¶
=  ()
−4 ( − )
2 (1 + )
2 (2 − )
³
 (2 − )(3− )( +1 )
2 +2 2 − 4 − 2
´4
with
 ()=( 1 + )(3− )
¡
−26 +2 0 5 − 714 + 1103 − 762 +2 2  +1 3
¢

−28 − 16 − 325 +6 0 2 +4 6 − 1123 +9 2 4.
Since (1 + )(3− )
¡
−26 +2 0 5 − 714 + 1103 − 762 +2 2  +1 3
¢
 0 for all ,w eh a v e () ≥
 (1) for all  and  ≥ 1.W eﬁnd that  (1)  0 for all ,h e n c e ,


µ
NC

()
¶
 0
for all  and for all 1, and hence, NC ()  0.
Now, we prove that NC is higher when the marginal cost of component development, (),i s
higher. Since the FOC can be written as
NC



+
1
2
()=0 
due to the concavity of the proﬁt function, a higher () yields a higher degree of cooperation NC.
Finally, we prove the proposition for the FC scenario. Let FC (()) = II,FC (()) −
(FC (())). The proof follows the proof for the NC scenario; using that


FC

= −16( − )
2 (1 + )
¡
2 −  +1
¢
³
(2 − )(1+)
2  − 4
´3
is negative.
39A5 Partial-cooperation Replacing for PC
 and PC
 into (20), the gross proﬁto fﬁrm  can be
rewritten as

III,PC
 =
³
(3 − ) −
¡
1+2  − 2¢¡
 − PC
 − (1 − )PC
−
¢
+( 1− )
³
 − PC
 − (1 − )PC
−
´´2
(1 + )
2 (3 − )
2 (2 − )

Computing the FOCs for PC
 and PC
− for  =1 2, and solving the system of equations, we ﬁnd PC

and PC
− as deﬁned in (13) and (14), respectively. SOCs for PC
 and PC
−, which can be rewritten
as

4
(2 − )(1+)
2,a n d
2(1− )
¡
2 − 2 − 1
¢2
(2 − )(1+)
2 (3 − )
2 
,
respectively, hold for
max
(
1
2(1− )
¡
2 − 2 − 1
¢2
(2 − )(1+)
2 (3 − )
2 
)

A6 Variations of PC
 and PC
− with respect to  For the common components, we have
PC


=
8( − )(3 − )
¡
4 − 1 − 2¢
³
 (1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− )+2 2 − 4 − 2+2 (2 − 4 +1 )
´2
+
8( − )
³
( +1 )( 3− )
2 ¡
2 −  +1
¢
 − (1 − )
¡
2 − 2 +3
¢´
³
(1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− )+2 2 − 4 − 2+2 (2 − 4 +1 )
´2



The ﬁrst term is positive if 4−1−2  0,t h a ti s ,i fe ,w h e r ee  =2−
√
3 ≈ 0268. The second
term is always negative, as ( +1 )( 3− )
2 ¡
2 −  +1
¢
−(1 − )
¡
2 − 2 +3
¢
 0 for all  when
1 (required by the SOC at stage 2). For the non-common components we have
PC
−

=
4( − )
¡
2 − 2 − 1
¢¡
2 − 4 +1
¢
³
(1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− )+2 2 − 4 − 2+2 (2 − 4 +1 )
´2
+( − )
¡
2( +1 )
¡
24 − 113 +1 9 2 − 11 +5
¢
 +8 
¡
2 − 2 +3
¢¢
³
(1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− )+2 2 − 4 − 2+2 (2 − 4 +1 )
´2



The ﬁrst term is positive if 2 − 4 +1 0,t h a ti s ,i fe . The second term is negative as
2( +1 )
¡
24 − 113 +1 9 2 − 11 +5
¢
 +8 
¡
2 − 2 +3
¢
 0 for all  and .
A 7 P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . It is straightforward, since we have PC
 PC
− =2 (3 − )
¡
1+2  − 2¢
,
which is an increasing function of , and we have   0.
40A 8 P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . With NC, the process R&D investment per-component is
NC =
2( − )
¡
1+2  − 2¢
 (1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− )+2 2 − 4 − 2
,
whereas with PC it is
PC
 =
( − ) × 4(3 − )
(1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− )+2 2 − 4 − 2+2 (2 − 4 +1 )
for the common components, and
PC
− =
( − ) × 2
¡
1+2  − 2¢
(1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− )+2 2 − 4 − 2+2 (2 − 4 +1 )

for the non-common components. First, we have PC
 ≥ PC
− if and only if 4(3 − ) ≥ 2
¡
1+2  − 2¢
,
which is equivalent to  ≥ e . Second, we have PC
− ≥ NC i fa n do n l yi f2
¡
2 − 4 +1
¢
≤ 0,w h i c h
is equivalent to  ≥ e . Finally, we have
FC =
4( − )
(1 + )
2 (2 − ) − 4

and
PC
 =
4( − )
(1 + )
2 (2 − )+[ 2 2 − 4 − 2+2 (2 − 4 +1 ) ](3 − )

We have FC  PC
 if and only if 4−
£
22 − 4 − 2+2 
¡
2 − 4 +1
¢¤
(3 − ), which is true
i fa n do n l yi f2(1− )
¡
2 − 4 +1
¢
 0,t h a ti s ,e .
A 9 P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . We use a reduced form for the proﬁt function. Let PC ()=
II,PC() − (PC
 () PC
− ()). Since the equilibrium of the second stage subgame is
symmetric, each ﬁrm making PC (), maximizing joint proﬁts with respect to  is equivalent to
maximizing PC ().T h eF O Cc a nb ew r i t t e na s
ΠPC


=
PC

+
PC



+
1
2
()=0 .
The ﬁrst term (a direct eﬀect) corresponds to the sum of the direct eﬀects in (16). Whereas, the
second term (an indirect term) corresponds to the sum of the indirect eﬀects in (16). We analyze
the eﬀect of  on these direct and indirect eﬀects of  on proﬁt( ﬁrst term and second term of the
41FOC above). The direct eﬀect is given by
PC

=2 ( − )
2  ()
h³
(2 − )(3− )(1+)
2  +2 (1 + 2)+2( 2 − 2 − 4 − 1)
´i3
The denominator is positive for all , ,a n d,a si th a st h es a m es i g na sPC
 and PC
 ≥ 0
necessarily. The numerator increases with .W h e n  =1 , it becomes a function of  and 
deﬁn e do nt h ec l o s e dc u b e[01]
2. It can be shown that the minimum of this function on [01]
2 is
equal to 0 (for  =  =1 ), hence that it is positive. Therefore, for all  ≥ 1 and all  and ,w e
have PC ≥ 0, that is, the direct eﬀect is positive.
Now, we study the variation of PC with respect to .W eh a v e


PC

= −2
 ()
h³
(2 − )(3− )(1+)
2  +2 (1 + 2)+2( 2 − 2 − 4 − 1)
´i4
where () is a second-degree polynomial in .T h e t e r m i n 2 of  is a function of  only,
and for all  ∈ [01] it is strictly positive; hence,  is inverted bell-shaped. The highest root of  is
a function of  and  over the closed cube [01]
2; hence, we can determine its maximum for () ∈
[01]
2, which is equal to 1.S i n c e 1 (required by the SOC at stage 2), this proves that  is
positive for all  and  and 1, hence that 
¡
PC
¢
  0, which means that the direct
eﬀect decreases with .
The indirect eﬀect is given by
¡
PC
¢
(). The second term in this expression is always
negative and is independent of . Therefore, we study the sign of PC a n di t sv a r i a t i o nw i t h
respect to .W eh a v e
PC

=2 ( − )
2 ()
h³
(2 − )(3− )(1+)
2  +2 (1 + 2)+2( 2 − 2 − 4 − 1)
´i3
The denominator is strictly positive if 1. The numerator has the opposite sign of ,a n d is
a second degree-polynomial in . The factor in 2 is equal to (1 + )
3 (3 − )
3 (2 − )
¡
2 −  +1
¢
,
which is strictly positive, hence  is inverted bell-shaped. The highest root of  (if it exists) is a
function of  and . We compute the maximum of this root for () ∈ [01]
2,a n dw eﬁnd that
this maximum is equal to 1. Therefore, since 1 by the SOC, we have PC  0 for all ,
 and . It follows that the indirect eﬀect is always negative.
42To determine the variations of PC with respect to , we compute


PC

=(  − )
2 ()
h³
(2 − )(3− )(1+)
2  +2 (1 + 2)+2( 2 − 2 − 4 − 1)
´i4,
where  is a second-degree polynomial in .S i n c et h et e r mi n2 is strictly negative for all  and
,t h e n is bell-shaped. We determine the maximum of  for () ∈ [01]
2,a n d
max
(
1
2(1− )
¡
2 − 2 − 1
¢2
(2 − )(1+)
2 (3 − )
2 
)

We ﬁnd that the maximum is equal to 0. Therefore, for all () ∈ [01]
2 and
max
n
12(1− )
¡
2 − 2 − 1
¢2 
³
(2 − )(1+)
2 (3 − )
2 
´o
,
we have  ≤ 0,h e n c e
¡
PC
¢
 ≤ 0, which implies that the indirect eﬀect increases with
.
B1 Consumer welfare and social welfare For a given , consumer welfare and and social
welfare under three scenarios are as follows:
NC =
(2 − )(3− )
2 (1 + )
2 ( − )
2 2
h
(1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− )+2 2 − 4 − 2
i2,
NC =(  − )
2 2(1 + 2)(2− )(1+)
2 (3 − )
2  − 4
¡
1+2  − 2¢2
h
 (1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− )+2 2 − 4 − 2
i2 − 2().
FC =
(2 − )(1+)
2 ( − )
2 2
h
(1 + )
2 (2 − ) − 4
i2 ,
FC =(  − )
2 2(1 + 2)(2− )(1+)
2  − 82
h
(1 + )
2 (2 − ) − 4
i2 − 2().
PC =
(2 − )(3− )
2 (1 + )
2 ( − )
2 2
h
(1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− ) +2 2 − 4 − 2+2 (2 − 4 +1 )
i2.
43PC =
( − )
2 2()
h
(1 + )
2 (3 − )(2− ) +2 2 − 4 − 2+2 (2 − 4 +1 )
i2 − 2(),
with
()=( 1+2 )(2− )(1+)
2 (3 − )
2 −4
¡
1+2  − 2¢2+
¡
4+1 6  − 44 − 642 +3 2 3¢
.
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